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GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF FINANCIAL SYSTEMS:
THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF SYSTEMIC RISK
Reviewed by B. Salman Banaei
KERN ALEXANDER, RAHUL DHUMALE, & JOHN EATWELL, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
OF FINANCIAL SYSTEMS: THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF SYSTEMIC RISK,
(Oxford Univ. Press 2006).
I. INTRODUCTION
Systemic risk may be the "scariest" term in a central banker's vocabulary.
2
What is systemic risk? Consider the returns on a single investment, the actual
return on an investment has two components: expected return plus (or minus) an
unexpected return or risk return.3 This risk return may be broken down into two
categories: unsystemic and systemic.4 Unsystemic risk is sometimes called
idiosyncratic risk; it is the kind of risk that is specific to an asset.5 This kind of
risk is diversifiable because variance in asset returns tend to be reduced in a
portfolio with an increasing number of different assets. 6 In contrast, systemic or
market risk is non-diversifiable. 7 An increase in adverse systemic risk affects the
returns on all assets sensitive to systemic risk in the globalized economy.8 The
term "systemic risk" is used in Global Governance of Financial Systems to denote
a specific kind of systemic risk "arising from the mispricing of risk in financial
markets, which often means that risk is underpriced in relation to its cost and that
1. D.N.M., Ecole Nationale Supdrieure du Pdtrole et des Moteurs (2008); M.Sc., Colorado
School of Mines (2008); J.D., University of Denver Sturm College of Law (2007); B.A., University of
Virginia (2002).
2. Caroline Baum, Fed Cuts Rates to Address Greater of Two Evils, BLOOMBERG, Sept. 19, 2007
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601039&refer=colurmistbaum&sid=aYDiXuOxdpWo.
3. STEPHEN A. Ross, RANDOLPH W. WESTERFIELD & JEFFREY F. JAFFE, CORPORATE FINANCE
286 (Michele Janicek ed., 6th ed. 2002).
4. Id. In other words, where R is the actual rate of return and R' is the expected or risk-free,
return and U is the uncertainty or risk premium, then R = R' + U. U may be positive or negative. In this
note and in the book reviewed herein, adverse systemic risk, or an unexpected lower than expected
yield, is used interchangeably with the more general term "systemic risk."
5. In other words, if m is systemic risk and & is unsystemic risk, then U = m + s. Id. at 288.
6. Id. at 262.
7. Id. at 263.
8. Sensitivity to systemic risk is quantified in some financial models as 3. Id. at 271.
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the underpricing of risk results in too much of it being created in financial
markets." 9
In Global Governance of Financial Systems: the International Regulation of
Systematic Risk, authors Kern Alexander (a lawyer and economist), Rahul
Dhumale and John Eatwell (economists) (the Authors), argue three principal
points: (1) current international and domestic efforts to contain the generation of
systemic risk in financial systems are inadequate; (2) this inadequacy increases
systemic risk; and (3) an international regulatory response is required.1 0 This book
note considers the first two arguments and related points in section II and the latter
in III.
II. THE FAILURE OF REGULATORS TO PREVENT THE CREATION OF SYSTEMIC RISK
Systemic risk is "created by individual financial institutions [and] the
aggregate amount of risk created by all financial institutions in global financial
markets."" As firms enter into risky investments 2 , the aggregate of these risks
accumulates, becoming a "negative externality that imposes costs on society at
large because [these] firms fail to price into their speculative activities the full
costs associated with their risky behavior." 13 Moreover, "adequate regulation [to
prevent systemic risk] at the international level has not accompanied" the
globalization of financial services and capital flows. 14
Adequate regulation could have prevented many recent examples of systemic
risk causing events that followed from a failure of the current regulatory regime.
Two specific examples may be posited as illustrations of the Authors' thesis: one
considered by the Authors, the Asian Financial Crisis of the late 1990s and the
other a more recent event, the United States Subprime Mortgage Crisis of 2007.
Both of these display at least three common themes associated with a failure to
regulate the generation of systemic risk in financial systems. First, there was an
"underpricing of risk" by lenders and an absence of effective regulation to compel
the pricing of risk associated with their lending practices. 15 Second, there were
9. KERN ALEXANDER, RAHuL DHUMALE & JOHN EATWELL, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF
FINANCIAL SYSTEMS: THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF SYSTEMIC RISK 14 (2006) [hereinafter
"GLOBAL GOVERNANCE"].
10. Id.
11. Id. at 15.
12. Id.
13. Id. at24.
14. Id. at 3.
15. For information on the Asian Crisis see GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, at 204
("Following liberalization, banking systems in many countries have experienced significant problems
with large capital inflows in the absence of adequate internal controls and prudential oversight to
contain the increased risk of new and expanded activities."). For the U.S. Crisis, see Martin Feldstein,
Liquidity Now!, WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 2007, at A19, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB118955944544924579.html ("Credit risk in financial markets had been
underpriced for years, with low credit spreads on risky bonds and inexpensive credit insurance
derivatives provided by investors seeking to raise their portfolio returns. With such underpricing of
risk, hedge funds and private equity firms substantially increased their leverage.").
VOL. 35:3/4
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF FINANCIAL SYSTEMS
failures in the banking sector once these risks were realized. 16 Third, in at least
some instances, there was some degree of expectation on the part of the lenders
that the government would intervene if the debtors defaulted. 17 These shared
common characteristics preceded a common result: fear of a broader and
international economic downturn, with either "systemic risk"' 8 (United States) or
"contagion"' 9 (Asia) being the associated buzzword.
These domestic financial crises soon become global financial crises given the
interconnectedness of financial markets. The globalization of financial systems
has "made financial institutions more interdependent and thus more exposed to
systemic risk that can arise from bank failures and to volatility in cash flows."
20
This globalization of systemic risk is especially pronounced in some sectors, most
importantly, in the banking industry:"
21
The Authors point out that the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s would
have been avoided if the regulators in the affected nations had planned their
liberalization programs with greater foresight.22 Specifically, regulators should
have implemented "prudential policies" that would have established "better risk
16. For information on the Asian Crisis see GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, at 205
(excessive lending lead to a "buildup of nonperforming loans"). For the U.S. Crisis, see Associated
Press, As Foreclosures Surge, Mortgage Lenders Pressured to Offer Borrowers Relief, INT'L HERALD
TRIB., Oct. 23, 2007, http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/10/24/business/NA-FIN-US-Avoiding-
Foreclosure.php ("24 percent of the roughly 82,000 loans [issued by Countrywide] were in
foreclosure."), See also Feldstein, supra note 15 ("The subprime mortgage defaults have triggered a
widespread flight from risky assets, with a substantial widening of all credit spreads, and a general
freezing of credit markets.").
17. For information on the Asian Crisis see GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, at 205 ("[T]he
belief that financial institutions were protected by the government raised moral hazard issues."). For
the U.S. Crisis, see Nouriel Roubini's Global EconoMonitor, Who is to Blame for the Mortgage
Carnage and Coming Financial Disaster? Unregulated Free Market Fundamentalism Zealotry,
http://www.rgemonitor.com/blog/roubini/184125 (Mar. 19, 2007) ("The sub-prime and overall
mortgage carnage is now likely to lead to a financial crisis whose cleanup and bailout costs will make
the S&L bailout bill look like spare change. We are only at the beginning of this fallout but, already,
several proposals and bills in Congress have been submitted to help millions of sub-prime homeowners
on the verge of bankruptcy and foreclosure."). See also Jeanne Sahadi, Subprime Bailout: Taxpayer
Toll, CNN.coM, Oct. 22, 2007,
http://money.cnn.com/2007/10/22/real-estate/bailout-cost/?postversion=2007102212.
18. "[I]n August [of 2007], the negative performance of the financial markets was related mostly
to a sharp increase in perceptions about systemic risks." Posting of Greg Ip to Real Time Economics,
August vs. October: Credit Crunch vs. Slowdown, http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2007/10/22 (Oct. 22,
2007, 10:54 EDT).
19. Taimur Baig and Ilan Goldfajn, Financial Market Contagion in the Asian Crisis, 42 IMF
STAFF PAPERS 167, 181 (1999), available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/Pubs/FT/staffp/1999/06-
99/pdf/baig.pdf ("The spreads on dollar-denominated debt [among afflicted Asian economies],
representing default risk, display[s] the most striking degree of correlations and evidence of
contagion."); see also Definitions and Causes of Contagion,
http://wwwl .worldbank.org/economicpolicy/managing%20volatility/contagion/definitions.html (last
visited Feb. 10, 2008) ("Contagion is the cross-country transmission of shocks or the general cross-
country spillover effects.").
20. GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, at 14.
21. Id. at 15.
22. Id. at 204.
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management measures at the microeconomic level. 23 The inexperienced Asian
banks lacked such effective policies and the "absence of adequate internal
controls" on risk taking further increased risk-taking by these banks, leading over
time to a "buildup of nonperforming loans." 24 These banks' risky investments
adversely impacted international financial systems and amounted to the
externalization of the full social cost of these risky investments onto the broader
national and international economy. 25
Government intervention after a financial crisis in contrast to a prudential
regulatory standards intended to prevent a financial crisis, may serve to increase
the moral hazard problem.26 For example, in the 1990s some Asian governments
prescribed lending to specific non-performing market sectors. -7  Under the
guidance of these government directives, the foreign depositors assumed that the
same government institutions would protect the banks' holdings in these market
sectors in the event of failure. 28 Not only do such firms undervalue risk, but the
moral hazard created by the perception that the government would bail them out in
the event of a market failure further increases the underpricing of risk by banks and
thus the degree of systemic risk borne by the international economy._9
The Authors argue that the current international regulatory framework for
"banking supervision" is "especially" flawed .30 The Basel Committee on Banking
Regulation and Supervisory Practices (Basel Committee) "exercises either direct or
indirect influence over the development of banking law and regulation for most
countries.' Its most recent set of proposals, known as "Basel II," the Basel
Committee intended to make the "regulatory capital 32 held by banks more sensitive
to [] economic risks. ' 33  But despite Basel H's superficial similarity with the
Authors' concern: the lack of an effective international regulatory framework for
banking, Basel H is a fundamentally flawed attempt to limit systemic risk. More
specifically, the Authors argue that Basel H is flawed on institutional and
substantive grounds.
First, the Basel Committee that proposed Basel HI has several critical
institutional flaws. Chief among these flaws is the Basel Committee's imbalanced
decision-making structure. For example, "the Basel Committee is composed of the
central bank governors and national bank regulators of the... thirteen richest
developed countries. 34 Nations outside of the Committee have no direct influence
23. Id. at 205.
24. Id. at 204-05.
25. See id. at 24.




30. Id. at 3.
31. Id. at 37.
32. Regulatory capital accounting is distinguished from banks' true economic capital. See id- at
224. It is the capital that is weighed in determining a bank's capital adequacy requirements- See id
33. Id. at 40.
34. Id. at 41.
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on the Basel Committee's deliberations. 35  Additionally, the Basel Committee
decision-making procedures are secretive and lack transparency.3 6  Finally, the
Committee also has a record of "uneven implementation and enforcement., 37 The
result of this flawed institutional structure has been a slow and half-hearted
adoption of the Basel Committee's standards among national regulators and, more
importantly, the Committee's regulations ignore the development needs or banking
realities in non-developed nations.38
Moreover, Basel II's substantive rules do not effectively address the problem
of systemic risk. Prior to Basel II, the Basel Committee attempted to control credit
risk by implementing minimum capital adequacy standards. 39 These standards
were later criticized for being overly rigid.40 Ostensibly, Basel II aims to address
the rigidity problem with more flexible capital adequacy standards. 4 1 As such,
Basel II presents a regulatory framework consisting of "mutually reinforcing
pillars" intended to create a flexible, yet effective framework for banking
regulation.2
First, Basel II provides banks two options for making their regulatory capital
determination. 43 The first is a standardized approach paralleling the "one-size-fits-
all" pre-Basel II standards,44 with some modifications.45 The second capital
determination model allows banks to use their own internal ratings. 46 The Authors
note that the second internal determination model results in "greater risk
sensitivity., 47 However, this model is flawed: first, it is overly flexible on the
individual firm level in that there is little guidance on principles individual firms
35. See id. at 42.
36. Id. at 44.
37. Id. at 44.
38. See id. at 45.
39. See id. at 228.
40. See id. at 230. The 1988 Basel Capital Accord (supplanted by Basel II in 2002) required
banks "actively engaged in international transactions to hold capital equal to at least 8 percent of risk-
weighted assets in an effort to prevent banks from increasing credit risk through greater leverage." Id.
at 228.
41. See id. at 230.
42. Id. at 230. See also Basel Committee on Banking Supervision,, The Basel I: International
Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: a Revised Framework, 4, available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs107.htm (June 2004) [hereinafter "Basel IlAccord'].
43. GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, at 231.
44. Id.
45. Id. For example, the pre-Basel II rules provided no credit conversion factor on loan
commitments of less than a years duration. Basel II, however, "imposes a 20 percent credit conversion
factor." Id.
46. Id. For example, a bank may estimate each borrower's creditworthiness and then calculate an
estimate for future losses. Id.
47. Id. at 232.
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may use to guide their capital determination needs48; second, the lack of principled
guidance for national regulators may lead to regulatory arbitrage. 9
The second pillar of Basel II also requires supervisory review of internal bank
decisions. These include "efforts by banks to assess their capital adequacy and by
supervisors to review such assessments., 50 The purpose of supervisory review is
twofold: (1) to "ensure that banks have adequate capital to support all the risks in
their business" and (2) "to encourage banks to develop and use better risk
management techniques in monitoring and managing their risks.' The third
pillar of Basel II is market discipline.52 This pillar complements "the minimum
capital requirements (Pillar 1) and the supervisory review process (Pillar 2)."" 3
This pillar sets forth disclosure requirements that allow "market participants to
assess key pieces of information on the scope of application, capital, risk
exposures, risk assessment processes, and hence the capital adequacy of [banking]
institution[s]. '54
The end result of applying the first pillar of determining regulatory capital
coupled with the third pillar, market discipline, results in the "homogeneity of
financial markets." 55  Banks comporting with the first pillar will construct risk
determination models that are based on similar analytical models.56 Furthermore,
the third pillar encourages banks to follow similar disclosure standards and adjust
their operations accordingly. The result is similar modeling methodologies that
will lead banks to react to the same objective market information in a uniform
manner. 57  This model-driven behavior "encourage[s] firms to act as a herd,
charging toward the cliff edge together.",58 The resulting homogeneity in financial
48. Specifically, the use of credit rating agencies is criticized by the Authors. Id. at 231 ("[T]hese
private agents may act either in their own interests or in that of the borrower in hopes of maximizing
their own gains by issuing favorable [credit risk] ratings."). The Authors' caution echoes more recent
comments made by Former U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman, Alan Greenspan, blasting these same credit
agencies for facilitating the global credit crisis that commenced in 2007. Von Norbert Kuls & Claus
Tigges, Die Ratingagenturen Wissen Nicht Was SieTun, FAZ.NET, Sep. 22, 2007,
http://www.faz.net/s/Rub034D6E2A72C942018B05D0420E6C983 1/Doc-EF5A672F689134A84842B
34B3471D2713-ATpl-Ecommon-Scontent.html (,,Die Ursache des Problems war, dass die Leute
glaubten, die Ratingagenturen verstinden etwas vom ihrem Geschaft. Die wissen aber nicht, was sic
tun.") (quoting Alan Greenspan). According to Greenspan, these credit agencies mispriced credit risk
and the market, unfortunately, believed their ratings. Id. Any regulatory overhaul - national or
internation in scope should, therefore, take into account the skewed incentives credit agencies currently
have.
49. GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, at 233.
50. Basel IIAccord, supra note 41, 11.
51. Id. 720.
52. Id. 1 809.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, at 260.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 261. Moreover, the Authors note, homogeneity is a growing problem outside of the
banking regulations proposed by Basel II. See id. ("As financial markets become seamless ... banks,
securities firms, insurance companies, pension funds, and so on" are adopting standard analytical
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markets will exaggerate the amplitude of the market's reaction to objective
financial data resulting to increased systemic risk.59
The tendency of Basel II's first and third pillars to encourage dangerous
homogeneity makes the second pillar, supervisory review of bank capital
determination models, all the more important.6 ° On this point, the Authors argue
that the scope of the Basel Committee supervisors' regulatory discretion is too
broad and may result in "inconsistent or ineffective standards." 61 In light of Basel
II's institutional construction, the Basel Committee supervisor's are narrowly
exposed to the risk-taker with inadequate consideration of those who are most
vulnerable to the risk-taker's actions. 
62
The Author's posit a market-based approach to pricing and regulating the risk
inherent in banking. In Chapter 9, Reforming the Basel Accord and the Use of
Subordinated Debt: Making Markets Work for the Regulator, the Authors consider
whether requiring banks to hold subordinated debt would increase market
discipline. 63 These debt issuances would be "unsecured, uninsured, and junior to
deposits." 64 This debt would create a class of "financially sophisticated class of
creditors with better incentives for monitoring financial institutions" and the risk
associated with their investments.65  Ultimately, the Authors find that a
subordinated debt requirement would provide banking regulators a strong, market
based figure that would allow them to regulate risk more effectively.
66
It is not just the Basel Committee and banking regulation that is flawed. In
Chapters 2, 3, and 4 (i.e., Global Governance and International Standard Setting,
The International Legal Framework for International Financial Regulation, and
International Soft Law and the Formation of Binding International Financial
Regulation, respectively) the Authors examine the current institutional and legal
framework for financial regulation. The Authors find that the current system of
principles in gauging risk.) By applying the same or similar rules in gauging risk, homogeneity
becomes a factor affecting all financial systems falling to the same risk gauging fads. Id. As an
example of this regulatory fad, the Authors quote the Chairman of the United Kingdom's Financial
Services Authority, Sir Howard Davies as stating: "[o]ur general view is that the capital treatment
should be the same, where the risks are the same." Id. Excessive reliance on quantitative models has
been blamed for the collapse of equity markets in August 2007. David Rocker, Letter to the Editor,
Wall Street Borrows, Main Street Pays, BARRONS, Sep. 17, 2007,
http://online.barrons.com/article/SBI 18981089018628145.html ("Since most of these firms [using
similar quantitative models] analyzed a common market history, a strong correlation of longs and shorts
developed throughout the quant-fund industry. As more capital was deployed in the strategy, a self-
reinforcing spiral was created: Demand for 'positive' stocks increased, boosting their prices, and selling
in 'negative' stocks increased, pressuring their prices.").




63. Id. at 227.
64. Id.
65. See id.
66. Id. at 237.
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international financial regulation is inadequate at addressing systemic risk.67
Current "international regulatory efforts" amount to little more than "haphazard
responses to specific crises that threaten" global financial stability. 68 Institutional
regulatory bodies were designed to address specific economic issues, but necessity
has forced them to expand their regulatory jurisdiction. For example, the
International Monetary Fund, originally founded to "foster international trade and
economic reconstruction in war-ravaged member countries," 69 has expanded its
original role, outside of its initial legal authority, to "setting standards for the
management of systemic risk.",70  Because the IMF was not designed for this
function, it is no surprise that it has "failed to accomplish the overall objective of
effectively managing systemic risk." 71
In Chapters 6 through 9, the Authors expand upon specific issues relating to
their thesis. In Chapter 6, Incentives versus Rules: Alternative Approaches to
International Financial Regulation, they opine upon the best means of regulation,
weighing rule-based regulation against incentive-based regulation. 72 In Chapter 7,
The Economics of Systemic Risk in International Settlements, the Authors consider
a context in which a lack of incentive-based rules might increase the likelihood of
systemic risk.73 They posit that payment settlement systems are the "channels
through which funds are transferred between financial institutions in the form of
electronic debit and credit-book entries., 74  The key issue is whether payment
systems should follow a collateralized overdraft system, which is favored in the
European Union, or a non-collateralized overdraft system with fees charged for
overdrafts, which the United Stated has adopted. 75 The Authors lean toward a
collateralized overdraft system because it "internalizes the costs of risks in
payments systems by reducing the threat of gridlock" that would occur in the case
of a non-collateralized financial institution's failure and its impact on
interconnected finance systems. 
76
In Chapter 8, A Microeconomic Examination of Financial Fragility: A Test of
Capital Adequacy Standards, the Authors conduct a quantitative analysis of capital
adequacy standards.77  They find that rules-based capital adequacy standards
appear to have led, especially in East Asia, cosmetic changes in capital ratios and
other unintended consequences arising from regulatory efforts in those nations.78
67. See id. at 32-33.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 84.
70. Id. at 93.
71. Id.
72. See id. at 181.
73. See id. at 184.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 185.
76. Id. at 200.
77. See id. at 201.
78, See id. at 225-26. These East Asian nations are Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea. Id. at
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III. PROPOSED SOLUTION
The Authors provide two methods for addressing the problem of systemic
risk. First, in Chapter 5, Strengthening the Global Financial System through
Institutional and Legal Reform, they present guidance on addressing the problem
through the creation, by way of treaty, of a Global Financial Governance Council
("GFGC").7 9 Unlike most of the current international financial institutions ("IFI"),
the GFGC would operate in full transparency and would provide "representatives
from all states" to have authority in developing "international standards and rules
for financial regulation to existing international supervisory bodies." 80
Overstretched IFIs like the IMF and World Bank should then return to their
founding purposes instead of reaching into areas they are ill-equipped to regulate.
Second, at the close of the book in Chapter 11, Summing Up and Conclusion:
The New Financial Architecture - Promise or Threat?, the Authors provide a more
general proposal. 81 Here, the Authors present five specific guidelines for the
international financial regulators of the future. First, regulators must increase
financial heterogeneity. 82 This may be done by creating a regulatory body "with
the powers to develop [a] flexible structure of rules and rule making."
83
Additionally, the Authors argue this body should have broad enforcement and
monitoring powers. 84  Second, there should be an international lender of last
resort.85 However, the moral hazard associated with "liquidity without strings"
must be tempered by "powerful rules on risk taking." 86 Third, a "new financial
architecture should encompass macroeconomic concerns." 87  Fourth, the
regulators' rules "need to make greater use of the new work on extreme, rare
events. 88 Fifth, the scope of the regulators' activity should be the international
market itself. 89
Finally, in Chapter 10, Enhancing Corporate Governance for Financial
Institutions: the Role of International Standards, the Authors focus on corporate
governance issues. Consistent with their arguments throughout the book, the
Authors argue that the role of financial regulators should be to promote the public
good in light of principal-agent problems inherent when asymmetrical information
disparities exists between management and other stakeholders in a bank or
corporation. 9°
79. Id. at 162.
80. Id. at 163.
81. See id. at 268.
82. Id. at 269.
83. Id.
84. See id.





90. See id. at 244.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The United States Subprime Mortgage Crisis of 2007 presents another
illustration of the need for an international regulatory response to the problem of
systemic risk generated in international financial markets. As in the Asian
Financial Crisis of the 1990s, the mortgage market of the mid-2000s in the United
States was characterized by a "underpricing of risk" by lending institutions. 91 The
subprime chicken came home to roost in 2007 with mortgagors defaulting on their
loans in droves,92 and a resulting homogenous panic from risky assets bearing
these assets in their portfolio. 93 The effects soon spread to credit markets, with the
end result a general freezing of credit markets. 94  With credit more costly,
companies and individuals find it more difficult to borrow on the margin; the final
impact: it is expected that economic growth world-wide will decelerate. 95 The
broader impact of this American-originated financial crisis has yet to fully
materialize; it is, however, evident that the crisis will have an adverse impact on
the world economy, at the minimum through its direct impact on world credit
markets. 96
Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke has recently testified before the
U.S. House of Representatives, stating that "[t]he recent problems in subprime
lending have underscored the need not only for better disclosure and new rules but
also for more-uniform enforcement in the fragmented market structure of brokers
and lenders." 97 The United States Treasury Department has also recognized the
problem and "is seeking public input on how to overhaul the way Washington
oversees Wall Street, as the agency works to create a blueprint for a more-effective
regulatory structure." 98 Expost and narrowly tailored solutions to the systemic risk
91. Feldstein, supra note 15.
92. Bob Ivry, Half of 450,000 Subprime Mortgages Could Default, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Sep. 23,
2007, at E7 ("[M]ore than a quarter of subprime borrowers [out of 450,000] default on their adjustable
loans before the rates reset.").,
93. Id.
94. See Is the Credit Crunch Finally Over?, BBC NEWS, Sep. 20, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7003139.stm.
95. Id. ("The tightening up of credit and worries about mortgage repayments may make everyone
more nervous about borrowing money to buy big-ticket items like cars.").
96. See Carter Dougherty, Ripple Effects from U.S. Mortgage Crisis hit Pacific Rim, Int'l Herald
Trib., Aug. 1, 2007,
http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/08/01/business/stocks.php; see, e.g., James Kanter, Central Banks Act
Again to Combat Subprime Crisis, Int'l Herald Trib., Aug. 10, 2007,
http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/08/10/business/subprime.php ("BNP Paribas, the large French bank,
was freezing $2.2 billion held in three funds with exposure to U.S. subprime mortgages spark[ing]
concerns that the risk was spreading well beyond America's shores.").
97. Legislative and Regulatory Options for Minimizing and Mitigating Mortgage Foreclosures
Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Services, 110th Cong. 78 (2007) (Statement of Ben S. Bemanke,
Chairman, Board of Govms., Fed. Reserve System), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/benanke20070920a.htm..
98. Deborah Solomon, Treasury Seeks Input on Regulation Overhaul, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 2007,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 119214182307756559.html.
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created by the underpricing of risk in U.S. mortgage lending are inadequate. The
Authors persuasively argue that the solution to the underpricing of risk and the
systemic risk it generates requires an ex ante, systematic, and international
regulatory response. Purely "domestic" reforms "will be inadequate if not
accompanied by major institutional and legal reforms at the international level." 99
Without such international regulatory efforts, the failure of domestic regulators to
require financial firms to properly price risk will provide fertile ground for the
generation of more international financial crises. With domestic regulators at the
forefront of financial regulation, we will likely see more "haphazard responses to
specific crises that threaten" global financial markets.100 The Subprime Crisis
looming heavy on international financial markets, American and other financial
regulators should consider the argument presciently and persuasively made in
Global Governance of Financial Systems.
99. GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, at 3.
100. Id. at 32-33.
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